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Two fertile fields for research on the relationships between 
public policies and innovation are transportation and environmental 
protection. In both cases numerous policy instruments having 
different purposes, some of V.'hich are unrelated to the rate and 
direction of technological change, have been brought to bear on a 
rather diverse ccillection of related industries, some regulated 
relatively heavily and others subject to only a few administrative controls. 
Unfortunately, relatively few studies of the effect of 
transportation or environmental policy actions on innovation have been 
undertaken, and apparently no comprehensive study has ever been made 
in either area of how policies interact or how their impact differs 
according to such· factors as market concentration or extent of 
regulation. 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
Almost no research has been directed at the relationship 
bct'\veen environmental policies and technological change. Two 
theoretical studies have investigated parts of this relation, and no 
detailed err1pirical work has been undertaken. The rest of the literature 
contains nothing more than obiter dicta and reasonable though 
fundarnentally unproven observations on the performance of various 
policies in inducing technical change in areas directly related to 
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environmental consequences. The effects of environmental policy on 
unrelated R&D activities of affected firms appear not to have been 
considered at all. 
This section of this paper swnmarizes and evaluates the few 
explicit contributions t o  this subject. The scattered conjectures are 
also collected together and evaluated. 
Theoretical and empirical work in environmental economics 
and policy has concentrated almost exclusively on the choice of 
production tech..-i.ology from a fixed and known set of technological 
alternatives. If there is anything to the distinction between factor 
substitution and technological change, this work has little to contribute 
to our subject. Only those changes in technology characterized by 
uncertainty and fixed costs, which constitute innovations, are relevant. 
This definition excludes a large number of articles, especially in 
engineering journals, whose titles suggest relevance only because 
technological change is typically defined as a switch from one well­
known method to another. 
Three relevant topics have recieved some attention. First, 
there have been some explorations of the differences in impact on 
technical change among various types of environmental regulation. 
Second, some attempts have been made to discover the long-run 
consequences for the direction of technical change of eithe.r neglect 
or regulation of environmental effects. Finally, there have been a 
fev,: studies of how R&D decisions in specific industries have been 
affected by environmental policy. 
The three ideal types of pollution cont.rel policy studied in 
static models have been private negotiations, effluent charges aed 
standards. Richard Zerbe (1970] has made some commonsense 
comparisons of these types of pollution control regulations 
with respect to technical change. His diagrammatic, 
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partia-1 equilibrium analysis does not provide any definitive answers. 
His basic conclusion is that emission taxes have a more desirable 
effect than direct controls on the incentive to invent or adopt a new 
process which would reduce emissions controls. Subsidies 
may be superior to direct controls with respect to innovation, but not in 
all cases. The conclusions are based on the observation that under 
direct controls the only incentive for adopting an invention comes 
from its reducing the cost of meeting a fixed standard, whereas with 
an emission tax the invention may allow the firm to reduce both costs 
and, by reducing its emissions, its tax payments. 
The impact of any of these instruments on innovation will 
also depend on how the policies are revised after an innovation has 
occurred, and on what the affected firm expects this revision to be. 
Sinc.e such revisions could increase costs to some firms to a level 
higher than v.'hat prevailed v..'ithout innovation, it appears that any 
instrument may actually inhibit innovation. 
Barry Commoner [1971} has argued that innovations have 
had a bias which has harmed the environment, listing in defense of 
this proposition numerous new processes and products which are 
more harmful to the environment than those they replace. He argues 
that the environ1nent can be considered a fac'tor of production with a 
zero price, and finds evidence that over time pollution per dollar of 
GNP has increased. The latter argument has an interesting defect: 
we cannot tell \.vhether substitution betv..·een the environment and 
more expensive factors of production or technological change: is 
responsible for increasing pollution. The reason, of course, is that 
changing relative prices may be accompanied by both substitution and 
technical change. In general, to disentangle the effects one nee-ds 
some independent estimates of the magnitude of one of the effects. 
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A step toward careful examination of this problem has been 
made by Adam C1ifford [1973). He assllllles the existence of a trade-off 
between environment-saving and factor-saving innovation, and eXa.mines 
the effect of an emission tax on technology. He also finds conditions 
under which pollution can be reduced without any reduction in the 
production of commodities. 
In an unpublished paper, V. Kerry Smith has made sirnila.r 
use of the assumption that there i.s a fixed trade-off between 
innovations which save on standard factors, capital and labor, and 
innovations which tend to reduce impact on the environment. He 
shows that, under very restrictive assumptions of a Cobb-Douglas 
production function and a linear innovation possibility frontier, 
innovations which reduce damage to the environment. vanish if the 
price of environmental services is zero. 
There has been a useful study (Jacoby and Steinbruner 
[ l 973a] ) of the development of new technology to meet emission 
standards for new vehicles. This study and a study done for the 
Office of Science and Technology cor�jecture that the very specific 
combination of performance criteria and time horizon in the Clean 
Air Act made the choice of adding additional equipment to the 
existing internal combustion engine the clear optin1al choice for the 
industry. Bain [ 1970] has also commented on this choice. 
Unfortunately, although attractive, this conjecture has never becin 
supported by further work. 
Obviously, any improvement in our understanding of the 
innovative process in general v..'ill contribute to our understanding of 
the effect of environmental policy on innovation. Theoretical research 
into the response oi innovation to price changes could improve on the 
rather ad hoc n1odcls applied by Gifford and Srnith to the analysis of 
the effect of effluent charges on innovation. Indeed, any of the theoretical 
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work recommended elsewhere in this project would contribute to the 
analysis of this policy area. 
The effluent charge is only one, and a rather minor one, 
of the policy instruments used to regulate environmental impact. 
Performance standards and equipment standards are more commonly 
used, and have obvious impacts on the innovative process. Comparisons 
of such instruments based on detailed empirical work are needed. 
The impact of specific policy instruments may vary with the 
organization of the industries to which they are applied. The findings 
of Kamien and Schwartz and others on the relation between market 
structure and innovation are relevant to this endeavor, but nowhere 
have such models been applied to the explanation of the effect of 
environmental policy on innovation. In particular, a study along these 
lines of the automobile industry is desperately necessary. 
Finally, there is an obvious relation bet\veen the expectations 
held by regulated firms as to hov•: the environmental controls will be 
enforced and the way innovation responds. There is, for example, 
a considerable folklore that the automobile industry has lagged in 
innovation because of its belief t hat standards will not be enforced if 
it fails to produce an engine which can meet the standards. Although 
Jacoby and Steinbruner [1973a and 1973b], Bain [1970], and Klein [1974]
provide some comments on thi.s problem, there has been no detailed 
study which is adequate to establish whether or not the automobile 
industr�r has lagged, and if it has, why. Looking al the regulatory 
process as involving mutual interaction between regulators and
regulated is a necessary first step to model adequately the 




Studies of the transportation sector are so numerous that 
11transportation studies'1 has almost become a discipline onto itself. 
Economists have studied virtually every aspect of the efficiency of 
transportation, including the effects of various government policies, 
and the engineering literature contai..J.s numerous studies of potential 
developments in transportation technology. Unfortunately, neither 
literature appears aware of the existence or the frame of reference 
of the other. Only in a few instances have studies immediately come 
to grips with the relationship between policy and innovation in the 
transportation sector, and in nearly every case the resulting 
publication has been a discursive, journalistic allegation of a particular 
effect, rather than a completely convincing scientific inquiry. 
The folklore of transportation economics is that regulation 
has undermined efficiency in the transportation sector on almost 
every front. Scholars who have studied surface freight transportation 
have concluded that regulation imposes annual costs of several billion 
dollars by c·ausing irrational allocations of f1·eight by mode and by 
requiring uneconomic services and empty back-hauls (see Friedlaender; 
Meyer, Stenason, Peck and Zwick; and Moore). In all of these 
studies, thwarting cost-saving innovations contributes to the cost 
estimates, at least implicitly; however in none is there systemmatic 
investigation _on a theoretical level of the mechanism by which this 
happens, the behavioral system that causes these effects, or even their 
approximate magnitudes. Similarly, comprehensive studies of air 
transportation usually make references to technical choices, but 
do not systemm.atically study them (see Caves, Eads). Finally, 
studies of the effect of regulation on prices are purely static, rarely 




Wben the effects of regulation are examined, the method 
employed is normally a discussion of a particular innovation that was 
(unwisely) promoted or retarded by regulators, not always intentionally. 
The best literature on the effects of regulation on the innovative 
behavior of industry is the series of case studies to be found about 
transportation innovations; however, for reasons to be elaborated 
below, the best is still not very illuminating. 
Fairly convincing evidence has been assembled to show that 
t.l:tree railroad innovations were seriously retarded by the policies of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission. In a study of the ICC's 
response to the unit train, MacAvoy and Sloss shov;r that the 
innovation was economically warranted and desired by the industry 
about forty years before it was widely adopted. But adoption was 
delayed because the ICC demanded that new services be offered to all 
customers at comparable costs, whereas it made no atternpt to undo 
price discrimination in existing services. As a result, the profits 
to be gained by the railroads from capturing business from other 
modes (notably water transport) by offering unit train service were 
more than offset by the reductions in profits they would have 
experienced by offering the service to existing customers who had no 
opportunity to use other modes and who, therefore, were being 
charged very high prices for the old service. 
Although less convincing than the MacAvoy-Sloss analysis 
because of the absence of actual cost and revenue data, it still seems 
clear on the basis of published research that the ICC did severly 
retard two other innovations: the Big John hopper car and piggyback 
truck-rail shipping. The Big John case (see Gellman [ 1971] ) 
involved the introduction of a new, large car for hauling grain that 
enabled the user of the car, the Southern Railway, to reduce rates 
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about sixty percent if shippers1 agreed to use the entire car and to 
ship directly fro1n origin to destination, waiving transit privileges. 
Other grain shippers, notably the barge lines who really had no 
effective competitive response, bitterly fought the Big John system_. 
and twice the ICC vacated the new rates. Eventually, under 
pressure from adverse court rulings, the ICC permitted the new rates 
and thereby made possible the adoption of Big John cars; however J:hey had 
succeeded in delaying full use of the innovation for more than four 
years. 
The piggyback case (see Gellman [ 1971] and Note) 
involved a similar type of conflict among freight modes, and a similar 
result in terms of retarding a cost-saving innovation. For various 
reasons having to do with the technical problems of attaching trucks 
to railroad cars, handling flat cars in switchyards, and accommodating 
car design to the realities of the roadbed, the cheapest technology for 
piggybacking \vas to use a very short _flatcar, large enough for but 
one truck, and to transport only the freight container of the truck 
instead of the entire trailer. But the ICC policy of establishing rates 
on the basis of historical average costs prevented the rails from 
adopting the best technology, since they could not set a low enough 
price to encourage use of piggybacking if they carried only one truck 
per car nor could they incorporate into the price structure an incentive 
for truckers to use trucks with detachable freight containers. 
Consequently, piggybacking is inore expensive and less fully utilized 
than it could be. Unlike the Big John case, there is no indication that 
the ICC actively used average-cost pricing to retard the innovation and 
thereby reduce the incursion of railroads into the long-distance shipping 
business of truck firms. Nevertheless, the ultimate consequence w·as 
similar: to blunt the extent to vvhich an innovation \Vas permitted to 
produce intermodal redistributions of wealth. 
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Less \Vell-docurnented "horror stories" about the impact of 
regulation on transportation :innovation are part of the folklore of those 
who are interested in transpo:::tation policy. Gellman1s studies of 
aircraft and surface transportation contain several examples, the ICC 
practice of awarding trucking licenses for particular commodities 
bet\veen particular routes discourages the development of more 
general purpose, flexible trailer design; ·incomplete cost accounting 
for determining rates discourages the development of lighter, road­
saving trucks; in similar fashion, the fact that -during one historical 
period airlines actually showed accounting profits from crashes due to 
liability limits, depreciation rules and insurance procedures probably 
limited incentives for safety innovations (see also Phillips [ 197la] ). 
Existing rules for interfirm rental of freight cars have probably 
reduced the incentive for cost-reducing innovations here (see Capron 
and Noll). Entertaining journalistic 11exposes11 of ICC reactions to 
rail innovations are also periodically undertaken by John Kneiling in 
his colunm in Trains, a magazine for railroad buffs, which is a good 
place to look for ideas for research topics on teclmological change in 
railroads. 
Regulators do not always act to retard innovation; just as 
often they make decisions that provide unjustifiably strong economic 
signals to adopt new methods. In some cases the attempt to maintain 
high rates for low-cost services induces the development of new 
industries: pipelines were developed to some extent in response to 
very high prices for shipping fuels by the surface modes regulated by 
the ICC {see Gellman [ 1971] ), and the development of very small 
commuter planes has been promoted by the subsidies provided to 
general aviation in the use of FAA facilities (see Warford) and the 
minimum weight limit that defines which passenger airlines will be 
regulated (see Eads). Much has also been written about the incentives 
generated by CAB regulation for airlines to engage in service 
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competition since price competition is foreclosed, producing adoption 
of larger, faster planes (notably short-haul jets) more rapidly than is 
economically justified (see Eads and Gellman [ 1968] }; however 
Phillips argues that technical developments in aircraft are largely due 
to exogenous scientific breakthroughs [ 197lb] and that, because the 
CAB normally reflects the interests of the airlines, the mistakes 
arising from regulatory rules are really the mistakes of the airlines 
[ 197la] ). 
Finally, the transportation sector, particularly aircraft 
construction, has had much of its technological development paid for 
by the government, some indirectly as spin-offs from military 
development, some through FAA subsidies of air traffice control and 
safety, and some through direct research programs of NASA and 
more recently federal support of research on urban mass transit and 
alternatives to the internal combusion engine. l'-'llthough the 
relationship between military and civilian research and innovation in 
aircraft has been rather thoroughly studied (see Phillips [ 197Ib] and 
his references), none of the others have received any systemrnatic 
scrutiny. And even the Phillips study pays scant attention to the 
relationships between the rate of diffusion from military to civilian 
use of new technology and the regulatory environment of the carriers. 
Generalizations on Policy and Innovation 
The fe"v specific case studies described above usually also 
ll1clude more general statements of the relation bet"veen policy and 
innovative performance, usually stated as loosely-derived hypotheses, 
but sometimes based upon formal manipulations of relatively complete 
microtheoretic models. In addition, a few papers have been written 
about the interactions between policy and innovation that clearly apply 
to transportation, bUt deal with a broader segrnent of the economy. The 
following is a su1nmary of the hypotheses that has been offered: 
(1) Valuing investments at replacement costs encourages 
firms to keep old capital longer, thereby prolonging 
the introduction of capital-embodied innovations 
(Johnson) 
(2) Price regulation of competitive industries creates 
an excessive incentive for service-improving 
innovations (Caves, Gellman [ 1968] , Eads, Douglas 
and Miller). 
{3) At the same time, price regulation reduces the 
incentive for cost-saving innovations by limiting 
their potential market penetration (see Gellman 
[ 1971], Klein); however, this depends on ilnplicit 
assumptions about the appropriability of innovations 
-- the ability to capture the markets of others 
depends upon the ability of others1 to copy your 
innovation; also, the absence of price reductions 
due to regulation could, when demand is inelastic 
and regulation prevents competition, increase 
incentives to innovate), 
(4) Because regulation eliminates business risk-and 
severly restricts the freedom of firms to change 
operating methods, it encourages a corporate 
laxity that is inconsistent with innovative behavior 
(see Klein, Leibenstein); however, reducing the 
risk of innovation can promote it as well {see 
Capron). 
(5) Because the regulatory process is characterized 
by long delays in reaching decisions (i.e., 
regulatory lag), innovations that require active 
administrative response for approval will be 
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thwarted while those which can be adopted without 
approval and which an agency must respond to in 
order to reestablish the old profit rate and wealth 
distribution will be encouraged (see Capron, Joskow}. 
(6) Regulation creates an incentive for new L'ldustries 
that can avoid regulation (see Johnson on pipelines 
and Eads on commuter airlines). 
(7) Rate-base regulation encourages capital-using 
innovations for the same reasons that, in a static 
model, it encourages excessive capital-intensivity 
(see Averch and Johnson, Westfield). 
{8) Because of the way in which information is introduced 
and used in regulatory proceedings, the beneficiaries 
of technological change are likely to be accorded 
less '\Veight in decisions than are those who stand to 
lose by it, making regulators more t"isk-averse 
than are market participants (see Noll). 
(9) Cartel··like industry organizations, such as the ICC, 
inevitably reduce the nun1ber of innovations; because 
they operate by majority-rule, innovation proceeds 
according to the vision and innovative propensity of 
the member of the cartel at the mediall position, 
whereas in a competitive situation only one firm need 
be convinced, rightly or wrongly, of the value of an 
innovation in order for it to have a market test (see 
Davis). 
Conclusions anq Recommendations 
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Certainly the over:riding impression to be derived fron:i reading 
the literature on transportation is that the government has pretty 
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throughly mucked up the rate and direction of technical progress. 
Generally, the conclusion is that American society has had too much 
innovation '\Vith respect to air transportation, teclmologies using the 
highways and, perhaps, pipe lines, and too little iri..novation with respect 
to rails. In additic.n, within each component oi the industry innovation 
has been biased by policy instruments: too much emphasis on speed, 
too little on cost-economizing, particularly '\vith respect to spill-over 
effects, highway deterioration and the full exploitation of each mode's 
inherent advantages. 
The literature is far less suggestive of what could be done 
about the situation, other than abandoning regulation, giving 
regulators explicit instructions to change their ways, or subsidizing 
activities to overcome institutionalized uneconomic incentives. The 
limited range of policy options arises because researchers rarely 
let the regulatory process become a part of their conceptual model. 
The otherwise excellent studies of the performance of various parts of 
the industry mentioned above, and even the best studies of particular 
cases when innovations were unwisely retarded or promoted, contain 
no more than brief references to the process by which policy produced 
an unsatisfactory result. 
In order to produce adequately documented arguments for 
policy changes towards the transportation secto;r, two kinds of research 
are necessary. First, case studies like that of MacAvoy and Sloss, 
where the economics and engineering of_ a new innovation are throughly 
examined and net benefits estimated, are absolutely essential. Second, 
more emphasis in all research must be placed on the factors that 
govern the establishment and maintenance of regulatory policies. 
A particularly fruitful line of inquiry would be to blend these suggestions 
into comparative studies of innovations, some of \-Vhich were adopted by 
firms without any apparent attempt by regulators to interfere with the 
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process, in order to sort out the characteristics of a proposed change 
that are most likely to generate unwise intervention by regulators. 
The ICC is a particularly good candidate for such research, wher4� 
numerous freight car innovations are available to provide an adequate 
sample for exan1ining the behavior of the agency, the railroad industry 
and other modes under differing situations. 
Various government attempts at direct subsidization of 
transportation should also be examined. Thus far, no systemmati.c 
study has been attempted of why the VTOL and STOL research 
programs have not led to com1nercially exploitable innovations in 
aircraft. Was the cause the difficulty of fitting such craft into a 
regulated air fleet? Or was it the difficulty in obtaining urban landing 
sights that could take full advantage of the technology? Or was the whole 
concept a bad idea - - and if so, why has so much been spent on 
developing it for so long? ls there anything about this program that 
would shed light on the ability of the government to select and execute 
valid developmental projects in the area of transportation technology? 
Similar questions can also be asked about the "people-movern projects, 
the research into high-speed rails, and attempts to develop alternative 
automotive propulsion systems. 
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